Author is one of the most renowned and prominent scholars in Russian foreign policy, politics and IR. Offers a comparative approach of IR theories which situates Russian realism among the national and worldwide discourses.

The "Russian Idea" in International Relations identifies different approaches within Russian Civilizational tradition - Russia's nationally distinctive way of thinking - by situating them within IR literature and connecting them to practices of the country's international relations. Civilizational ideas in IR theory express states' cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. This book defines Russian civilizational ideas by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions. The author identifies leading voices among those positioning Russia as an exceptional and globally significant system of values and traces their arguments across several centuries of the country's development. In addition, the author explains how and why Russian civilizational ideas rise, fall, and are replaced by alternative ideas. The book identifies three schools of Russian civilizational thinking about international relations - Slavophiles, Communists, and Eurasianists. Each school focuses on Russia's distinctive spiritual, social, and geographic roots, respectively. Each one is internally divided between those claiming Russia's exceptionalism, potentially resulting in regional autarchy or imperial expansion, and those advocating the Russian Idea as global in its appeal. Those favoring the latter perspective have stressed Russia's unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia-Western relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history, including the history of ideas.

Author is one of the most renowned and prominent scholars in Russian foreign policy, politics and IR. Offers a comparative approach of IR theories which situates Russian realism among the national and worldwide discourses.

The "Russian Idea" in International Relations identifies different approaches within Russian Civilizational tradition — Russia’s nationally distinctive way of thinking — by situating them within IR literature and connecting them to practices of the country’s international relations. Civilizational ideas in IR theory express states’ cultural identification and stress religious traditions, social customs, and economic and political values. This book defines Russian civilizational ideas by two criteria: the values they stress and their global ambitions. The author identifies leading voices among those positioning Russia as an exceptional and globally significant system of values and traces their arguments across several centuries of the country’s development. In addition, the author explains how and why Russian civilizational ideas rise, fall, and are replaced by alternative ideas. The book identifies three schools of Russian civilizational thinking about international relations – Slavophiles, Communists, and Eurasianists. Each school focuses on Russia’s distinctive spiritual, social, and geographic roots, respectively. Each one is internally divided between those claiming Russia’s exceptionalism, potentially resulting in regional autarchy or imperial expansion, and those advocating the Russian Idea as global in its appeal. Those favoring the latter perspective have stressed Russia’s unique capacity for understanding different cultures and guarding the world against extremes of nationalism and hegemony in international relations. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of Russian foreign policy, Russia–Western relations, IR theory, diplomatic studies, political science, and European history, including the history of ideas.

Since Russia has re-emerged as a global power, its foreign policies have come under close scrutiny. In Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, Andrei P. Tsygankov identifies honor as the key concept by which Russia's international relations are determined. He argues that Russia's interests in acquiring power, security and welfare are filtered through this cultural belief and that different conceptions of honor provide an organizing framework that produces policies of cooperation, defensiveness and assertiveness in relation to the West. Using ten case studies spanning a period from the early nineteenth century to the present day - including the Holy Alliance, the Triple Entente and the Russia-Georgia war - Tsygankov's theory suggests that when it perceives its sense of honor to be recognized, Russia cooperates with the Western nations; without such a recognition it pursues independent policies either defensively or assertively.

Since Russia has re-emerged as a global power, its foreign policies have come under close scrutiny. In Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin, Andrei P. Tsygankov identifies honor as the key concept by which Russia's international relations are determined. He argues that Russia's interests in acquiring power, security and welfare are filtered through this cultural belief and that different conceptions of honor provide an organizing framework that produces policies of cooperation, defensiveness and assertiveness in relation to the West. Using ten case studies spanning a period from the early nineteenth century to the present day - including the Holy Alliance, the Triple Entente and the Russia-Georgia war - Tsygankov's theory suggests that when it perceives its sense of honor to be recognized, Russia cooperates with the Western nations; without such a recognition it pursues independent policies either defensively or assertively.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow's foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow's policies have shifted under different leaders' visions of Russia's national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal "Westernizers" era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia's identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia's enduring quest for great-power status.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow's foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow's policies have shifted under different leaders' visions of Russia's national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal "Westernizers" era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia's identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia's enduring quest for great-power status along with its desire for a special relationship with Western nations.

Intellectual ideas on the international community can make important contributions to how cultures perceive one another. Yet these same ideas can also be misunderstood by other societies when they are framed in a culturally exclusive manner. In Whose World Order? Andrei P. Tsygankov examines how Russian elites engage American ideas of world order and why Russians perceive these ideas as unlikely to promote a just or stable international system. Tsygankov focuses on Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, which argues for the global ascendancy of Western-style market democracy, and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," which drew attention to what Huntington perceived to be an increasingly dominant global disorder. Tsygankov argues that Russian intellectuals received the ideas of these two prominent American scholars critically. Despite Huntington's and Fukuyama's intentions to contribute to the development of freedom and stability in the world, Russians viewed their theories at best as limitations to social and cross-cultural creativity and at worst as justification for a war-mongering, West-centered global dictatorship. Tsygankov traces the reasons for Russian perceptions to the ethnocentric nature of the two sets of ideas and the inability of their authors to fully appreciate Russia's distinctive historical, geopolitical, and institutional perspectives. Throughout this rich study Tsygankov points to the need for scholars to study cultural perceptions in world politics as a means of eliminating some of the obstacles that stand in the way of a truly global society. He also raises the issue of whether or not intellectuals should accept moral responsibility for the ideas theyproduce and what implications this may have for international relations theory. This important book recommends several ways in which ethnocentric bias can be overcome to move toward embracing the development of various communitarian projects in international relations. With its novel approach and perspective, Whose World Order? is certain to be widely discussed. It will be of value to anyone interested in international relations, comparative politics, and Russian studies.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow's foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow's policies have shifted under different leaders' visions of Russia's national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal "Westernizers" era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia's identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia's enduring quest for great-power status.

Recently, a renewed international interest in Russia as a world political actor has emerged. Against this background, it is useful to better understand how international relations and foreign affairs are studied in Russia and how future Russian political actors, diplomatic personnel, ministerial bureaucrats, business managers, area experts, and other officials, activists, or researchers are taught for their work on the international arena. What are the theories, approaches, and schools that guide Russian teaching on, and research of, international relations? The current state of Russian studies of International Relations to a large degree reflects the history and development of IR research during Soviet times. However, over the past 25 years, one could also observe a number of new developments--both substantive and institutional--which are important not only for properly assessing the new state of this academic discipline in Russia, but also for better comprehending Russian foreign policy as well as various international activities of Russia's regions, businesses, media, etc.

Now fully updated and revised, this clear and comprehensive text explores the past thirty years of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, and Putin. Challenging conventional views of Moscow's foreign policy, Andrei Tsygankov shows that definitions of national interest depend on visions of national identity and is rooted both in history and domestic politics. Yet the author also highlights the role of the external environment in affecting the balance of power among competing domestic groups. Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, Tsygankov shows how Moscow's policies have shifted under different leaders' visions of Russia's national interests. He gives an overview of the ideas and pressures that motivated Russian foreign policy in six different periods: the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, the liberal "Westernizers" era under Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the relatively hardline statist policy under Primakov, the more pragmatic course of limited cooperation under Putin and then Medvedev, and the assertive policy Putin has implemented since his return to power. Evaluating the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policies, Tsygankov explains its many turns as Russia's identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The book concludes with reflections on the emergence of the post-Western world and the challenges it presents to Russia's enduring quest for great-power status along with its desire for a special relationship with Western nations.

Intellectual ideas on the international community can make important contributions to how cultures perceive one another. Yet these same ideas can also be misunderstood by other societies when they are framed in a culturally exclusive manner. In Whose World Order? Andrei P. Tsygankov examines how Russian elites engage American ideas of world order and why Russians perceive these ideas as unlikely to promote a just or stable international system. Tsygankov focuses on Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, which argues for the global ascendancy of Western-style market democracy, and Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," which drew attention to what Huntington perceived to be an increasingly dominant global disorder. Tsygankov argues that Russian intellectuals received the ideas of these two prominent American scholars critically. Despite Huntington's and Fukuyama's intentions to contribute to the development of freedom and stability in the world, Russians viewed their theories at best as limitations to social and cross-cultural creativity and at worst as justification for a war-mongering, West-centered global dictatorship. Tsygankov traces the reasons for Russian perceptions to the ethnocentric nature of the two sets of ideas and the inability of their authors to fully appreciate Russia's distinctive historical, geopolitical, and institutional perspectives. Throughout this rich study Tsygankov points to the need for scholars to study cultural perceptions in world politics as a means of eliminating some of the obstacles that stand in the way of a truly global society. He also raises the issue of whether or not intellectuals should accept moral responsibility for the ideas theyproduce and what implications this may have for international relations theory. This important book recommends several ways in which ethnocentric bias can be overcome to move toward embracing the development of various communitarian projects in international relations. With its novel approach and perspective, Whose World Order? is certain to be widely discussed. It will be of value to anyone interested in international relations, comparative politics, and Russian studies.

This book explores how culture shapes foreign economic policy in post-Soviet states. After the Soviet empire fragmented, some of the newly emerged nations directed their economic activities primarily toward Russia and other former republics, while others turned sharply away from the Soviet bloc. Taking a constructivist approach, Andrei P. Tsygankov explains the striking variation by making the original argument that a new state's strength of national identity shapes its foreign economic policy. The stronger the identity, the more likely the new state was to shift away from the empire. Drawing on detailed case studies of Latvia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the author demonstrates how the Baltic nations, with a strong sense of identity, chose to deal with Russia and other ex-Soviet nations on a strictly bilateral basis and entered preferential arrangements with European countries. Ukraine, with moderate identity strength, pursued active economic relations with both Russia and Europe. Finally, Belarus, with a relatively weak identity, pursued an effort to reintegrate with Russia at the expense of developing ties with Europe. Employing a range of both qualitative and quantitative analysis, this study brings a national identity perspective into the forefront of international political economy theory.